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Defending Liberty,  
Pursuing Justice 
 
Frank Falcone 
   
 
 
Introduction 
The United States is a representative democracy that 
operates through a congressional system under a set of powers 
specified by the Constitution.  The Constitution contains a 
commitment to “preserve liberty” with a Bill of Rights and 
other amendments, guaranteeing the freedom of speech, 
religion, press, right to a fair trial, right to keep and bear arms, 
universal suffrage, and property rights.  The Constitution, the 
Bill of Rights, laws passed by Congress, and all of the treaties 
in which the United States has signed, give Americans rights 
and guidelines to which they can act.  These documents also 
outline the powers and duties of the three branches of the 
federal government.  Recently however, these powers have 
been distorted, manipulated, and ignored by those in power, 
who swore to protect them.  
Lately, the President has been exerting powers outside 
his constitutionally-formed boundaries because his lawyers 
have violated their professional obligation.  Not only must 
lawyers assist their clients in accomplishing their goals, but 
they have a duty, as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to 
uphold the law.  Lawyers must tell their clients not only what 
they can do, but also what they cannot do.  This duty compels 
all lawyers, especially lawyers in government service, because 
their ultimate client is the American people.  When 
representing all Americans, government lawyers must adhere 
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to the Constitution and the rule of law. The lawyers in the 
Department of Justice and those in other governmental 
agencies have supported these unconstitutional actions and 
frequently attempt to justify them.  It is the fault of these 
attorneys that the principle on which our government was 
formed has been violated by a dramatic swelling of U.S. 
presidential war time powers.  This deficiency can be seen by 
examining the constitutional structure, past usages of 
presidential war power, the War on Terror, and attorney 
duties.   
 
Constitutional Structure 
When the framers gathered in Philadelphia in 1787 to 
draw up the Constitution, existing models of government in 
Europe placed the war power solely in the hands of the King.  
The framers did not follow this tradition.  By learning from 
past mistakes, they deliberately took the power to initiate war 
from the executive branch and gave it to the legislature.  The 
framers, hoping to attain an ideal of republican government, 
constructed a Constitution “that allowed only Congress to 
loose the military forces of the United States on the other 
nations”.28  The delegates at the constitutional convention 
decided that the principle of collective judgment, shared 
power in foreign affairs, and “the cardinal tenet of republican 
ideology that conjoined wisdom of many is superior to that of 
one.”29
                                                 
28 Edwin B. Firmage, “War, Declaration of,” in 4 Encyclopedia of the 
American Presidency 1573 (Leonard W. Levy and Louis Fisher, eds. 1994). 
29 David Gray Adler, “Foreign Policy and the Seperation of Powers: The 
Influence of the Judiciary,” in Judging the Constitution: Critical Essays on 
Judicial Lawmaking 158 (Michael W. McCann and Gerald L. Houseman, 
eds. 1989). 
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In the British model, the power to initiate war remained 
with the monarch.  John Locke argues in his “Second Treatise 
on Civil Government” that to separate the executive and 
foreign policy powers would invite “disorder and ruin.”30  A 
similar model appeared in the “Commentaries on the Laws of 
England”, written by Sir William Blackstone in the eighteenth-
century.  He defined the king’s privilege as “those rights and 
capacities which the king enjoys alone.”31  Some of the 
privileges he considered included “the right to send and 
receive ambassadors and the power to make war or peace.”32 
These models of executive power were well known to 
the framers.  They knew that their forerunners in England had 
committed to the executive the sole power to go to war.  After 
the Revolutionary War, the founders constructed a model that 
vested all executive powers in the Continental Congress.  The 
framers gave many of Locke’s foreign policy powers and 
Blackstone’s principles to Congress.  The power to declare war 
was not given to a single executive.33  Instead, it was 
transferred to a group that would make a decision based upon 
collective wisdom.  Joseph Story, who served on the Supreme 
Court from 1811 to 1845, wrote about the republican 
principle’s views on war powers: 
 
The power of declaring war is not only the highest 
sovereign prerogative; but that it is in its own nature and 
effects so critical and calamitous, that it requires the 
utmost deliberation, and the successive review of all the 
councils of the nation. War, in its best estate, never fails to 
                                                 
30 John Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government, 146-48 (1690) 
31 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 238 (1803). 
32 Id. At 239 
33 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 50-
68 (1833). 
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impose upon the people the most burthensome taxes, and 
personal sufferings. It is always injurious, and sometimes 
subversive of the great commercial, manufacturing, and 
agricultural interests. Nay, it always involves the 
prosperity, and not unfrequently the existence, of a nation. 
It is sometimes fatal to public liberty itself, by introducing 
a spirit of military glory, which is ready to follow, 
wherever a successful commander will lead;…It should 
therefore be difficult in a republic to declare war; but not 
to make peace…The co-operation of all the branches of the 
legislative power ought, upon principle, to be required in 
this the highest act of legislation…34 
 
The debates at the Philadelphia convention showed that 
the framers were determined to limit the President’s authority 
to take unilateral military actions.  The early draft empowered 
Congress to “make war.”  Charles Pinckney objected that 
legislative proceedings “were too slow” for the safety of the 
country in an emergency, since Congress was expected to 
meet only once a year.  James Madison and Elbridge Gerry 
proposed to substitute the word “declare” instead of “make” 
in order to give the President “the power to repel sudden 
attacks” and this motion became law.35 
There was no doubt about the limited scope of the 
President’s war power.  The duty to repel sudden attacks was 
only put in place as an emergency measure and only permits 
the President to take actions necessary to resist sudden attacks 
either against the mainland of the United States or against 
American troops abroad.  The President never received a 
general power to send troops whenever and wherever he 
                                                 
34 Id at 60-61. 
35 Max Ferrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 4 vols. 
318-319 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1937). 
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thought best, and the framers did not authorize him to take 
the country into a full-scale war or to launch an offensive 
attack against another nation.36  John Bassett Moore, a noted 
scholar of international law, states: 
 
There can hardly be room for doubt that the framers 
of the constitution, when they vested in Congress the 
power to declare war, never imagined that they were 
leaving it to the executive to use the military and naval 
forces of the United States all over the world for the 
purpose of actually coercing other nations, occupying their 
territory, and killing their soldiers and citizens, all 
according to his own notions of the fitness of things, as 
long as he refrained from calling his action war or 
persisted in calling it peace.37 
 
To further limit the power of the executive branch, the 
framers decided to separate the purse from the sword.  The 
power of the purse, said Madison in Federalist No. 58, 
represents the “most complete and effectual weapon with 
which any constitution can arm the immediate representative 
of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and 
for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.”  
Madison insisted on keeping the power of Commander in 
Chief at “arm’s length” from the power to take the nation to 
war in order to protect civil liberties.38  Madison wrote: 
 
Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature 
of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to 
be commenced, continued, or concluded.  They are barred 
                                                 
36 The Collected Papers of John Bassett Moore 196 (1944). 
37 Id at 196. 
38 The Writings of James Madison 147-9. 
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from the latter functions by a great principle in free 
government, analogous to that which separates the sword 
from the purse, or the power of executing from the power 
of enacting laws.39 
 
At the Philadelphia convention, George Mason added 
that the “purse and the sword ought never to get into the same 
hands, whether Legislative or Executive.”40 
Despite these studies, John Yoo, legal counselor for the 
United States Justice Department, argued in 1996 that the 
framers constructed constitution systems that “encourage[d] 
presidential initiative in war.’41  He claimed that the 
Constitution’s provisions for the war power “did not break 
with the tradition of their English, state, and revolutionary 
predecessors, but instead followed in their footsteps.”42  He 
concludes that “the war power provisions of the Constitution 
are best understood as an adoption, rather than a rejection, of 
the traditional British approach to war powers.”43  That 
argument contradicts not only statements made at the 
Philadelphia convention and the state ratification debates but 
also the text of the Constitution. 
Over the next two centuries, several international 
incidents were by Presidents and their supporters to justify 
expanding the executive’s war powers at the expense of 
Congress.  The concept of “defensive war” was stretched to 
explain presidential war-making throughout the world.  In the 
twentieth century, other developments were used to inflate 
                                                 
39 Id at 148. 
40 Max Ferrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 4 vols. 
139-140 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1937). 
41 John C. Yoo, “The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original 
Understand of War Powers,” 84 Cal. L. Rev. 167, 174 (1996) 
42 Id. at 197 
43 Id. at 242 
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the President’s war power.  Without the legal support of our 
most respected attorneys, this power has extended beyond the 
intention of the framers and beyond the control of Congress 
and the public. 
 
Past Usages of War Powers 
 Presidential use of force during the first few decades 
after the Philadelphia convention went along with the 
expectations of the framers.  The decision to go to war or to 
engage in offensive strikes still remained with Congress and 
the president accepted that principle for all wars whether they 
were declared or undeclared.  This power gradually widened.  
For instance, in 1845, the President was allowed to provoke 
war with Mexico by moving troops and vessels. 44 
 Soon, presidents invoked the right to protect American 
lives and property abroad as justification for military 
intervention in foreign countries.  For example, on December 
9, 1891, President Benjamin Harrison reported an incident in 
Valparaiso, Chile to Congress; an incident which resulted in 
the death of two American seamen and the serious injury of 
several other Americans.  Although Harrison never 
recommended the use of force, he asked Chili for a suitable 
apology and adequate reparation for the injury done to the 
United States or else he would terminate diplomatic relations 
with them.45 
 Other examples include President Wilson’s actions 
during the outbreak of World War I.  In 1914, Wilson issued 
proclamations of neutrality, and in doing so he banned the 
                                                 
44 Charles C. Tansill, “The Presidents and the Initiation of Hostilities: The 
Precedents of the Mexican and Spanish-American Wars,” reprinted in The 
President’s War Powers: From the Federalists to Reagan 86 (Demetrios 
Caraley, ed. 1984).  
45 Joyce Goldberg, The “Baltimore” Affair 103 (1986). 
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“transmitting or receiving for delivery messages of an 
unneutral nature.”46  Later, he closed the Marconi Wireless 
Station at Siasconset, Massachusetts, because it refused to 
comply with these censorship regulations.  Attorney General 
Thomas Gregory justified these actions by stating that it was 
the President’s right and duty, in the absence of any statutory 
restrictions, to close down or seize any plant “should he deem 
it necessary in securing obedience to his proclamation of 
neutrality.”47 
 As soon as Germany had refused to abandon its policy 
of unrestricted submarine warfare, Wilson broke diplomatic 
relations with them.  Later, Wilson made the crucial policy 
decision to move from neutrality to armed neutrality, by 
arming American merchant ships, and finally to a state of war 
with Germany.  On April 2, 1917, Wilson called Congress into 
session to review the continued use of German submarines 
against neutral vessels.  Wilson stated that it “now appears [to 
be] impracticable,” to remain neutral and asked Congress to 
declare war on Germany.48   
 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt also led the 
country from a state of neutrality to one of war.  On September 
8, 1939, shortly after Germany invaded Poland, Roosevelt 
proclaimed a state of limited emergency.  During this time, the 
United States supplied war supplies to the Allied Forces to 
help them in the war against Germany and Italy.  In June 1940, 
when France requested additional assistance from the U.S., 
Roosevelt expressed his admiration for their “resplendent 
courage” in dealing with the German troops and promised to 
                                                 
46 James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of 
the Presidents, 20 vols. (New York: Bureau of National Literature, 7969-77 
47 Operation Attorney General 291, 293 (1914). 
48 Harvey A. DeWeerd, President Wilson Fights His War: World War I and 
the American Intervention 21 (1968). 
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continue to assist them with airplanes, artillery, and 
ammunition.  He informed France, however, that “these 
statements carry with them no implication of military 
commitments.  Only the Congress can make such 
commitments.”49   
 In order to further assist the Allies, Congress passed 
the Lend-Lease Act on March 11, 1941.  This act gave the 
President the authority to manufacture any defense item and 
to “sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise 
dispose of” a defense item to any country whose defense he 
determined to be vital to the defense of the United States.50 
 In a petition to Congress on April 10, Roosevelt asked 
for legislation that would allow him to make use of foreign 
merchant vessels that were lying idle in American ports.  
Roosevelt said clearly that he lacked authority to use these 
ships and Congress responded by granting him the necessary 
legislation.51  On December 7, 1941, Roosevelt asked Congress 
to declare war after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and 
Congress complied with his request.52 
 In 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower asked 
Congress to pass a resolution giving the President authority to 
use American air and sea power in Southeast Asia.  This was 
refused by Congress because of the possibility of another 
Korean War, and they insisted that any involvement by the 
United States would have to include the support of Britain and 
the other allies.  53 
In August 1964, following President Johnson’s report of 
an attack against U.S. vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin, Congress 
                                                 
49 Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin d. Roosevelt 267 (1940 volume). 
50 Statute 31, (1941). 
51 Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin d. Roosevelt 94 (1940 volume). 
52 Id. at 95. 
53 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change 82 (1963). 
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passed legislation to authorize the use of armed force.  Several 
years later, U.S. soldiers were stuck in a land war in Southeast 
Asia and had to deal with huge casualties.  As a result, 
Congress began to re-evaluate its role in twentieth-century 
wars, and after a long national debate, the War Powers 
Resolution of 1973 emerged.54 
 In an effort to limit presidential war power, Congress 
passed the War Powers Resolution.  The resolution recognized 
that the President “in certain extraordinary and emergency 
circumstances has the authority to defend the United States 
and its citizens without specific prior authorization by the 
Congress.”  Instead of trying to define the exact conditions 
under which Presidents may act and use force, the House 
decided on implementing procedural safeguards.  The 
President would be required, “whenever feasible,” to consult 
with Congress before sending American forces into armed 
conflict.  He was also to report the circumstances that led him 
to initiating action and the estimated scope of his activities.55  
Additionally, the President must remove U.S. armed forces if 
Congress had not declared war or passed a resolution 
approving the use of force within sixty days.56  If an official 
request is given by the President to Congress, the time limit 
can be extended by an additional 30 days only when 
“unavoidable military necessity” requires additional action for 
a safe departure.57 
 President Ford and President Carter reported only five 
uses of armed forces, and three of the occasions under Ford 
only involved military efforts to evacuate American citizens 
                                                 
54 “Southeast Asia Resolution,” joint hearings before the Senate Committees 
on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1964). 
55 Congressional Records 27298-408 (1970). 
56 Id. at Section 5(b). 
57 Id. at Section 5(c). 
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and foreign nationals from Southeast Asia.  Other than those 
operations, during the six and a half years of Ford’s and 
Carter’s terms of office there were only two presidential 
motions to use armed forces.  They were Ford’s efforts to 
rescue the Mayaguez crew in 1975, and Carter’s attempt to 
rescue American hostages in Iran in 1980. 58 
 Although military activity accelerated during the 
Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations, 
presidential power was not abused.  Reagan submitted 14 
reports under the War Powers Resolution and Bush six.  Most 
of the reports referred to major military operations such as the 
dispatch of U.S. Marines to Lebanon in 1982, the invasion of 
Panama in 1989, and the war against Iraq in 1991. 59 
 President Bush’s decision to pull out of Iraq after the 
military victory, rather than continue on to Baghdad, was later 
criticized since it allowed Saddam Hussein to regroup and 
gain power.  However, Bush acted in accordance with the UN 
Security Council resolutions and the congressional statute that 
only authorized him to take military action to remove Iraqi 
troops from Kuwait, and not to attack Baghdad.  The statute 
only allowed the President to use U.S. armed forces to eject 
Iraqi troops from Kuwait.  60 
 In A World Transformed, a book he later wrote with 
Brent Scowcroft, Bush states why he discontinued military 
operations after taking Iraqi troops out of Kuwait.  His 
position is interesting when compared to the more determined 
plans of George W. Bush, who chose in 2003 to occupy Iraq 
                                                 
58 “Seizure of the Mayaguez” (parts I and II), hearings before the House 
Committee on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); 121 
Cong. Rec. 18312-13 (1975) 85 Yale L. J. 774 (1976). 
59 “War Powers, Libya, and State-Sponsored Terrorism,” hearings before 
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986). 
60 UN Security Council Resolution 660-62, 664-67, 669-70, 674, 667, and 
678 
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after losing support from many nations, including Germany, 
France, and Russia.  In 1998, Bush stated:61 
 
I firmly believed that we should not march into 
Baghdad. Our stated mission, as codified in UN 
resolutions, was a simple one - end the aggression, knock 
Iraq's forces out of Kuwait, and restore Kuwait's leaders. 
To occupy Iraq would instantly shatter our coalition, 
turning the whole Arab world against us, and make a 
broken tyrant into a latter-day Arab hero. It would have 
taken us way beyond the imprimatur of international law 
bestowed by the resolutions of the Security Council, 
assigning young soldiers to a fruitless hunt for a securely 
entrenched dictator and condemning them to fight in what 
would be an unwinnable urban guerilla war. It could only 
plunge that part of the world into even greater instability 
and destroy the credibility we were working so hard to 
reestablish.62 
 
 It is apparent that although past Presidents have 
expanded their war powers set out in our Constitution, they 
have all done so with congressional approval.  Their actions 
were done in accordance with the law because they were 
given proper legal counsel.  The adequacy of presidential legal 
counsel has begun to dwindle over the past ten years with the 
emergence of the War on Terror.  The most senior lawyers in 
the Department of Justice and other governmental 
organizations have fought to justify actions that are so 
inhumane and blatantly illegal that they threaten the 
principles on which the United States was founded. 
                                                 
61 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed 464 (1998). 
62 Id at 464. 
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War on Terror 
 On June, 1993, President Clinton ordered an air strike 
against Iraq.  In an address to the nation, he spoke on the 
attempted assassination of former President Bush during a 
visit to Kuwait.  Sixteen suspects, including two Iraqi 
nationals, were arrested.  Although the trial of those suspects 
was still underway in Kuwait, the CIA stated that there was 
“compelling evidence that there was, in fact, a plot to 
assassinate former President Bush and that this plot, which 
included the use of a powerful bomb made in Iraq, was 
directed and pursued by the Iraqi intelligence service.”  As a 
result, Clinton called the attempted assassination of Bush “an 
attack against our country and against all Americans.”63  In a 
message to Congress, he said that the attack was ordered “in 
the exercise of our inherent right of self-defense as recognized 
in Article 51 of the UN Charter and pursuant to my 
constitutional authority with respect to the conduct of foreign 
relations and as Commander in Chief.”64 
 However, Clinton did not consult with members of 
Congress before ordering the launching of 23 Tomahawk 
cruise missiles against the Iraqi intelligence service’s principal 
command and control facility in Baghdad.  Clinton said that 
the attack on Baghdad “was essential to protect our 
sovereignty, to send a message to those who engage in state-
sponsored terrorism, to deter further violence against our 
people, and to affirm the expectation of civilized behavior 
among nations… We will combat terrorism.  We will deter 
aggression.  We will protect our people.”65  However, history 
has shown that his argument is flawed.  As, Michael Ratner 
                                                 
63 Public Papers of the Presidents, 1993, I, at 938. 
64 Id. at 940. 
65 Id. at 938-39. 
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and Jules Lobel, two attorneys of constitutional law noted, 
“calling the U.S. bombing of Iraq an act of self-defense for an 
assassination plot that had been averted two months 
previously is quite a stretch.”66  If the United States had 
evidence of terrorist activity by Syria, why would it have 
launched cruise missiles against intelligence facilities in 
Damascus?  Other methods, less confrontational, would have 
been used.  Many argue that Iraq was attacked because, like 
Cambodia, Grenada, and Libya, it was a weak and isolated 
nation that could be dealt with militarily with little fear of 
retaliation.  This air strike was no more than a ploy by Clinton 
to demonstrate his military “toughness.” 67 
 Following in Clinton’s footsteps, George W. Bush used 
the excuse of “combating terrorism” to further extend his 
presidential war power.  On September 11, 2001, terrorists 
from the Middle East hijacked four U.S. commercial airliners 
and flew two of them into the World Trade Center and one 
into the Pentagon, killing almost 3,000 people.  Bush 
responded with a proclamation on September 13, where he 
referred to the terrorist attacks as “acts of war.”68 
 During his administration, President George W. Bush 
expressed the concept of “preemptive action” much more 
ambitiously than the presidents before him and at times he 
even acted unilaterally, specifically when he authorized the 
creation of military tribunals to try those responsible for 9/11.  
Throughout this time, Congress and the courts provided 
                                                 
66 Michael Ratner and Jules Lobel, “Bombing Baghdad: Illegal Reprisal or 
Self-Defense?” Legal Times, July 5, 1993, at 24. 
67 Louis Fisher, “President Clinton as Commander in Chief,” in Rivals for 
Power, ed. James A. Thurber 215 (1996). 
68 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 1308. 
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hardly any legislation and even fewer judicial checks to his 
military initiatives.69 
 The potential scope of current presidential war power 
can be seen in the document titled “National Security 
Strategy,” released by the Bush administration in September 
2002.  This document articulates the doctrine of preemption 
and, the even broader concept of, preventative war.  President 
Bush pledged to “act against such emerging threats before 
they are fully formed… [History] will judge harshly those who 
saw this coming danger but failed to act.  In the new world we 
have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of 
action.”70  However, European nations feared that the new 
doctrine preferred unilateral U.S. military action at the price of 
multilateral institutions and international alliances.71 
 Before using military force against Afghanistan and 
Iraq, President Bush, after gaining statutory support, acted 
unilaterally on what he considered to be his independent 
constitutional power to create military tribunals.  On 
November 13, 2001, he issued a military order to authorize the 
creation of military tribunals to try an individual who was 
“not a United States citizen” who provided assistance to the 
9/11 attacks.  This action was done without mention to anyone 
on Capitol Hill, including the Judiciary and Armed Services 
Committees.72 
 In order to justify this action, Bush cited a unanimous 
ruling by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Quirin (1942), which 
upheld Franklin D. Roosevelt’s military tribunals used to try 
                                                 
69 “The Bush Doctrine,” Washington Post, September 22, 2002, at WK 12. 
70 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 
September 2002, page 2 of introductory statement by President Bush, 
September 17, 2002. 
71 Glenn Frankel, “New U.S. Doctrine Worries Europeans,” Washington 
Post, September 30, 2002, at A1. 
72 Bob Woodward, Bush at War 139-54 (2002). 
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eight German saboteurs.  William P. Barr, appointed Attorney 
General by the George H. W. Bush administration, coauthored 
an article titled, “Military Justice for al Qaeda,” where he 
called the 1942 decision the “most apt precedent” for what the 
Bush administration wanted to do in 2001.73 
 Tribunals are usually justified when civil courts are 
unavailable or not functioning.  In addition, the 1942 decision 
was revisited in 1945 when the Franklin Roosevelt 
administration adopted an entirely different procedure to deal 
with two other German spies.  In 1942, the eight Germans 
were charged, assigned defense attorneys, subjected to a trial, 
and allowed to challenge the tribunal’s jurisdiction before the 
Supreme Court.  The Bush administration misapplied the Ex 
parte Quirin precedent when it tried to relate it to U.S. citizens, 
Yasser Esam Hamdi and Jose Padilla.  Although Bush 
designated U.S. citizens as “enemy combatants,” he refused to 
charge them with a crime, allow them counsel, or bring the 
matter to trial.  Nothing in Quirin justifies holding a U.S. 
citizen indefinitely without access to counsel or a trial and 
attorneys such as William P. Barr knew this but argued 
differently out of respect for the President.74 
 In the initial debates of the war against Iraq, the Bush 
administration announced that President Bush did not need 
authority from Congress to mount an offensive war against 
Iraq.  The White House Counsel’s office presented a broad 
reading to the President’s power as Commander in Chief and 
argued that the 1991 Iraq Resolution provided continuing 
military authority to the President, transferring the authority 
                                                 
73 William P. Barr and Andrew G. McBride, “Military Justice for al Qaeda,” 
Washington Post, November 18, 2001, at B7. 
74 Dworkin, Anthony. "Detention of US Citizens May Open Anti-Terrorism 
Campaign to Legal Scrutiny." Crimes of War Project 17 June 2002. 13 Dec. 
2006 <http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-almuhajir.html>. 
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from George H. W. Bush to his son.75  This delusion would 
greatly disturb the framers, since they made the President 
Commander in Chief, not dictator. 
 The White House also claimed that Congress, by 
passing the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, had already approved 
U.S. military action against Iraq for violations of the UN 
Security Council resolutions.76  Then again, the statute’s efforts 
were to remove Saddam Hussein from power and replace him 
with a democratic government.  The law states that none of its 
provisions “shall be construed to authorize or otherwise speak 
to the use of United States Armed Forces (except as provided 
in section 4(a)(2)) in carrying out this Act.”77  The statute 
authorized military supplies to Iraqi opposition groups, but 
not war. 
 Although, Bush eventually abandoned his unilateralist 
approach and went to Congress for support, Congress was 
expected to act quickly.  According to one newspaper story, 
White House officials “have said that their patience with 
Congress would not extend much past the current session.”  
The administration wanted Congress to pass an authorizing 
resolution before it came to a close for the November elections.  
This left very little time for independent legislative debate and 
analysis. 78 
 Democrat Robert Byrd led the resistance to this motion.  
In response to Senator Daschle’s statement saying that he 
intended “to give the President the benefit of the doubt,” 
Bryrd stated, “I will not give the benefit of the doubt to the 
                                                 
75 Mike Allen and Juliet Eilperin, “Bush Aides Say Iraq War Needs No Hill 
Vote,” Washington Post, August 26, 2002, at A1. 
76 “Bush Rejects Hill Limits on Resolution Allowing War,” Washington 
Post, October 2, 2002, at A12. 
77 Statute 112 (1998). 
78 Mike Allen, “War Cabinet Argues for Iraq Attack,” Washington Post, 
September 9, 2002, at A1. 
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President.  I will give the benefit of the doubt to the 
Constitution.”79  Byrd saw the debate surrounding Iraq 
becoming a question of “how best to wordsmith the 
president’s use-of-force resolution in order to give him 
virtually unchecked authority to commit the nation’s military 
to an unprovoked attack on a sovereign nation.”  
Nevertheless, Congress granted Bush the authority he wanted.  
80 
 Later on, Bush referred to the “resolution of support” 
and said that the signing of the resolution did not “constitute 
any change in the long-standing positions of the executive 
branch on either the President’s constitutional authority to use 
force to deter, prevent, or respond to aggression or other 
threats to U.S. interests or on the constitutionality of the War 
Powers Resolution.”81  Bush stated that his combat order, 
which he delivered in March 2003, was within his 
independent constitutional powers.82 
 The failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq 
raised the question of whether the Bush administration 
misinterpreted or altered intelligence reports to amplify the 
nature of the Iraqi threat.  For example, during the time when 
Congress was considering whether or not to authorize military 
operations, Bush stated that Iraq “had stockpiled biological 
and chemical weapons.”83  In addition, on March 6, 2003 
shortly before going to war, President Bush said that Iraq “has 
weapons of mass destruction.”84 
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 Congress failed to comply with its constitutional duties 
when it authorized military action against Iraq.  The Bush 
administration did not present enough convincing information 
to rationalize statutory action in October 2002 and military 
operations in March 2003.  Congress did not demand sufficient 
credible evidence before passing the Iraq Resolution.  Political 
scientist and historian, Louis Fisher, writes, “Instead of 
passing legislation to authorize war, members of Congress 
agreed to compromise language that left the decisive 
judgment with the President.”85  By placing the power to 
initiate war in the hands of one person, Congress did exactly 
what the framers hoped to avoid when they drafted the 
Constitution.  Nevertheless, the framers created three branches 
to combat the union of two.  It is not the fault of the president 
whose job is only to execute the law, nor is it completely 
Congress’s fault whose job it is to create law.  It is the judicial 
branch’s responsibly to determine whether or not a law is 
constitutional and, more importantly, it is our nation’s 
lawyers’ duty to make sure justice is carried out. 
 
Lawyer/Department Duties 
Lawyers act as both advocates and advisors in our 
society. As advocates, they represent parties in criminal and 
civil trials by presenting evidence and arguing in court to 
support their client.  As advisors, lawyers counsel their clients 
concerning their legal rights and obligations and suggest 
particular courses of action in business and personal matters.  
Whether acting as an advocate or an advisor, all attorneys 
research the intent of laws and judicial decisions and apply 
them to the specific circumstances their clients face. 
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 The American Bar Association is the national 
representative of the legal profession.  They serve the public 
and the profession by promoting justice, professional 
excellence and respect for the law.  John Yoo now sits on the 
ABA’s Advisory Committee and its Standing Committee on 
Law and National Security.  However, he is mostly known for 
the work he did from 2001-2003 when he served as a deputy 
assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Counsel of the 
U.S. Department of Justice.  Yoo worked on issues involving 
foreign affairs, national security, and the separation of powers. 
86 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Yoo played an 
important role in the Office of Legal Counsel to the U.S. 
Department of Justice, where he frequently defended the most 
extreme legal actions the administration was considering.  For 
example, in August 2002, he wrote a memorandum arguing 
that both international and domestic legal prohibitions on 
torture represent unlawful restraints on presidential power.  
Yoo advised the President that the framers always intended 
for the executive to dominate foreign and military affairs.  He 
even ignored the fact that the Constitution places the authority 
to “declare war” unquestionable in the hands of Congress.  
Due to Yoo’s advice, President George W. Bush typically 
justified his legal positions in the War on Terror by noting that 
the Constitution makes him Commander in Chief and thus 
primarily responsible for defending the American people.87 
Congress’s authority to declare war was written to be a 
strict constitutional rule so that the executive could not simply 
mount war without formal congressional authorization.  Even 
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in the case of repelling sudden attacks, while the executive 
might need to act immediately in order to defend America, 
Congress must then be convened in order to provide proper 
constitutional guidance to the executive. 88 
Critics have called Yoo’s interpretation of the framers 
everything from eclectic to immoral.  He tends to devalue and 
ignore the Constitution because it works against his argument, 
while focusing on eccentric readings that were never intended 
to further an argument such as his.  Yoo manipulated the 
notion of the emergency situation so far that he portrayed the 
many undeniable threats (terrorism) to the nation as being 
worse than traditional forms of warfare or violent rebellion.  
William E. Scheuerman states, “If every significant threat to 
the political status quo (an outbreak of avian flu virus, for 
example, or another terrorist attack on U.S. territory) 
necessarily requires massive augmentations of poorly 
regulated executive power, Americans indeed will probably 
have to bid farewell to the rule of law.” 89 
However, this negligence to the law, to justice, and to the 
American people does not solely fall on one person.  The 
lawyers who approved and signed the Bush Administration’s 
memoranda, dated January 9, 2002, January 25, 2002, August 
1, 2002, and April 4, 2003, have also grossly misinterpreted 
and disregarded the U.S. Constitution.  Among these men are 
Attorney General, Alberto Gonzales, General Counsel of the 
Department of Defense, William J. Haynes II, Assistant 
Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, Jay S. Bybee, 
and, Justice Department Special Counsel Robert Delahunty. 
                                                 
88 Id. at 5-7 
89 Scheuerman, William E. "The Powers of War and Peace: the Constitution 
and Foreign Affairs After 9/11." The Political Science Review os (2005): 2. 
1 Dec. 2006. 
The Lehigh Review 
186 
Among other things, these lawyers have advised the 
President to ignore laws, treaties and the Constitution in 
regard to the treatment of prisoners because of his role as 
Commander in Chief.90  They have also contrived defenses to 
avoid independent responsibility for actions that would 
violate the U.S. Army Field Manual and relevant statutes and 
precedents.  This was done by altering definitions of 
“necessity,” “self-defense,” and “superior orders.”91 92 93 
These lawyers have also instructed the President that he 
has the authority to authorize the infliction of extreme 
physical pain and mental distress by defining “torture” so 
strictly as “equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying 
serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of 
bodily function, or even death.” According to the memoranda, 
physical or mental pain does not amount to torture except if 
“it results in significant psychological harm of significant 
duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years.”94  This memo 
was allegedly prepared in order to provide justification for 
cruel methods previously practiced by the CIA, in case CIA 
agents were later prosecuted for breach of the federal anti-
torture statutes.95 
In addition, these lawyers advised the President that 
regardless of warnings issued by the Department of State, the 
U.S. does not have to follow the rules set out in the Geneva 
Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War when 
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dealing with the war in Afghanistan.96  The memoranda 
ignores that the treaty, in fact, regulates all conflicts “at any 
time and in any place whatsoever,” and also defends 
“unlawful combatants,” people do not qualify as prisoners of 
war, from “humiliating and degrading treatment” and 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture.”97  Attorney General 
John Ashcroft stated that the reason why the administration 
claimed immunity from the Geneva Convention was to give 
the American military and law enforcement officers a 
justification to allegations relating to “field conduct, detention 
conduct or interrogation of detainees” since their actions are 
forbidden by the Geneva Convention.98 99  
Finally, they condoned the use of mind altering drugs 
that do not “disrupt profoundly the sense of personality.” As 
maintained by the memorandum, these drugs must “create a 
profound disruption… more than that the acts ‘forcibly 
separate’ or ‘rend’ the senses or personality.  Those acts must 
penetrate to the core of an individual’s ability to perceive the 
world around him, substantially interfering with his cognitive 
abilities, or fundamentally alter his personality.” 100 
These memoranda and others like them attempt to 
thwart deep-rooted and universally acknowledged principles 
of law and morality for the pursuit of power.  In addition, the 
memoranda have gone against the practices of the United 
States since it goes against the principles fostered in the 
nation’s annual Human Rights Report.  Regardless of how one 
defines it, torture will always remain torture.  In August, 2002, 
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Jay S. Bybee, the Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 
Counsel, issued a belated disclaimer in response to public 
outcry over the memorandum.  However, the disclaimer does 
not take back the abuses that this memorandum has approved 
or promoted during the two years that it was in effect. 101 
Furthermore, several major Supreme Court decisions, 
various statutes passed by Congress, and explicit provisions of 
the Constitution itself refute the declaration that the 
President’s authority as Commander in Chief allows him to 
ignore laws, treaties, and the Constitution.  To make matters 
worse, this declaration also transfers this imagined power to 
those acting on the President’s behalf to violate domestic and 
international law by practicing violent interrogation methods 
and other obscene behavior.  These legal documents fail to 
acknowledge the many sources of law that their assertions 
violate, such as the steel seizure case, Youngstown Sheet and 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer that limits the power of the President to 
seize private property.102  The unique and poorly researched 
statement that the Executive Branch is a law unto itself 
completely contradicts the rule of law and the notion that no 
one is exempt from the law. 103 
The lawyers who advised and approved these 
memoranda have acted against their professional obligations.  
Not only do lawyers have a duty to assist their clients in 
accomplishing their goals, but lawyers have a duty, as officers 
of the court and as citizens, to defend and support the law.  
Lawyers must not only tell their clients what they can do but 
also what they cannot do.  This duty compels all lawyers, and 
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especially those in government service, since their ultimate 
client is the American people.  When representing all 
Americans, government lawyers must adhere to the 
Constitution and the law.  As a matter of fact, government 
lawyers take the following oath: “I . . . do solemnly swear that 
I will support and defend the Constitution of the United 
States…” 104 
While attorneys of the Department of Justice and lawyers 
in other governmental agencies have in the past met this 
standard, current members occupying legal positions in this 
administration have not only ignored these unconstitutional 
actions, but frequently attempted to justify them.  They have 
recommend individuals ignore the nation’s laws and offered 
advice to minimize their liability for doing so.  By doing this, 
these lawyers abandoned the standard of their profession and 
did a great disservice to all American citizens. 
 
Conclusion 
The United States Constitution is the government’s 
foundation of law and order.  Through its text, laws are 
constructed and decisions made.  Although some areas of the 
Constitution are vague and require interpretation, the section 
on the separation of powers is clear.  The framers made this 
section unmistakable because they did not want the United 
States to be controlled by a king.  This standard, coupled with 
international treaties and policies can also be seen when 
examining how past Presidents have acted when confronted 
with wars.  While they have all acted in their own way, they 
all have respected the laws, especially by communicating with 
Congress.  With the help of our government’s lawyers, the 
Bush Administration’s actions in response to the events of 9/11 
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have changed the notion of presidential war power from the 
principle of collective judgment to that of an absolute 
monarchy. 
The American Bar Association’s motto is “Defending 
Liberty, Pursuing Justice”.  Currently, these goals have been 
disregarded by some of the government’s senior lawyers as 
they have advised the President to act in violation of the 
Constitution and international law.  They have claimed 
presidential rights that disregard the law, asserted 
permissibility for illegal and immoral actions, and contrived 
defenses for lawless procedures.  By doing this, these lawyers 
have shown no respect to the American people, the 
Constitution, and the principles of justice. 
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